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RECENT CASES
incidental to the trip.18 In these cases the provocation for the offer of trans-
portation is the joint pleasure of the parties and the sharing of expenses is
simply an exchange of social amenities and courtesies among close friends.
It should be kept in mind that whatever degree of benefit is required by
the jurisdiction to take the case out of the operation of the guest statute,
it is basic that such a result can be reached only if the benefit is the chief
moving influence for the furnishing of the transportation.' 9 Thus it must ap-
pear clear that to a great degree each case presents a factual problem as
to the existence or non-existence of a benefit to the host. The court in the
instant California case,20 for example, appears to be influenced in its de-
cision by the comparatively large sum contributed by the plaintiff's to the
defendant. In the Ohio case, 2 1 on the other hand, the court, reaching an
opposite result, relies heavily upon the close relationship of the plaintiff and
defendant in failing to find a "compensation".
The California case represents the liberal trend and it is hoped that North
Dakota, whose guest statute 22 appears untested in this respect,2 3 will see
fit to follow this late trend, thus contributing some measure of security to the
regrettable position of the guest who must otherwise bear the brunt of a
situation not of his own making.
JAMES L. TAYLOR
CRLMINAL LAW - INSANITY - PRESUMTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF - IN-
STRUCTIONS. -The defendant was convicted of the crime of rape. Upon a
plea of not guilty, the entire defense was based on the defendant's insistence
that he could not remember what had occurred at the time the offense was
committed. No evidence was offered by the defendant to raise the issue
of insanity, nor was there a request by him to submit such issue to the jury
under the guidance of instructions. Witnesses for the prosecution testified
that the defendant had appeared to be "in a trance" and "abnormal." How-
ever, two psychiatrists testified, apparently in rebuttal to what was con-
ceived to have been a defense of insanity, that the defendant was of sound
mind. On appeal, it held that the complete absence of instructions by the
trial court on the issue of the defendant's insanity required that the base
be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d
612 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
Persons who are insane cannot be held criminally responsible for their
18. Fiske v. Wilkie, 67 Cal. App.2d 440, 154 P.2d 725 (1945); Eubank v. Kiels-
meier, 171 Wash. 484, 18 P.2d 48 (1933). Compare McCann .v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d
279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937) with Walker v. Adamson, 9 Cal.2d 287, 70 P.2d 1914 (1927).
19. Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d 237, 143 P.2d 704 (1943); McCann v. Hoffman,
9 Cal.2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937); Rogers v. Vreeland, 16 Cal. App.2d 364, 60 P.2d
585 (1936) (sharing expenses of short drive to mountains to see flowers did not
constitute compensation); Dorn v. Village of North Olmstead, 133 Ohio St. 375, 14
N.E.2d 11 (1938); Syverson v. Berg, 194 Wash. 86, 77 P.2d 382 (1938) (mother's
chaperoning of daughter who had dance date with defendant did not bestow sufficient
benefit upon defendant to take mother out of guest statute).
20. Whitmore v. French, 235 P.2d 3 (Calif. 1951).
21. Ames v. Seifert, 99 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio 1951).
22. N.D. Rev. Code c. 39-15 (1943).23. Cf Bentley v. Oldetyme Distillers Co., 71 N.D. 52, 298 N.W. 417 (1941) (where
court discussed problem of compensation but main issue adjudicated was question of
existence of agency).
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acts.1 In the absence of anything to the contrary, however, there is a re-
buttable presumption that the defendant in a criminal case, if a person of
the age of discretion, is sane.2  The factual basis of the presumption of
sanity lies in judicial knowledge, s but beyond this initial point the courts
entertain a wide divergence of views in regard to the burden of proving
the sanity or insanity of a defendant.
4
There are two distinct views on the question of whether the prosecution
bears the burden of proving sanity, or whether the defendant has the burden
of establishing insanity. The first view, known as the English rule,5 places
the burden of proving insanity upon the defendant who must plead and
prove it as a matter of defense 6 by a preponderance of evidence. 7 The
courts supporting this rule base their decisions upon the theory that in-
sanity is an affirmative defense and also upon the ground of public policy,
in that insanity can easily be resorted to as a sham defense. The United
States Supreme Court, however, has rejected the latter reason.8
The second view, sometimes referred to as the American rule, 9 holds that
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was sane and criminally responsible,1° just as it must prove any other ma-
terial fact.11 However, until the issue of sanity is raised, by either the de-
fendant's evidence or by the prosecution,1 2 the burden of proof, in the sense
of the risk of nonpursuation, is satisfied by the presumption of sanity.
1 3
Thus, althought the ultimate burden remains with the prosecution, the bur-
den of going forward with the evidence is immediately upon the defendant,
and it is generally agreed that to overcome the presumption, sufficient evi-
1. See Halloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945) "Our collective conscience
does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame."; State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46,
102 Pac. 641 (1909) "To convict a sane man who is innocent is deplorable but to
sentence an insane man to the penitentiary for a crime that he did not have mental
capacity to commit would be intolerable. To concede that the law is impotent, and the
courts powerless to avoid such a result, is a concession that we are not prepared to make."
2. Established by Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 CI. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep.
718 (1843); State v. James, 96 N.J.L. 132, 114 Atl. 553 (1921) "It is not the law
that a defendant's mental condition must be such as to enable him to realize the
fullest extent of his acts. The test of responsibility would be the capacity of the
defendant at the time of the doing of the act complained of, to distinguish between
right and wrong, with respect to the act."
3. See, Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906,
907 (1931).
4. See Weihofen, Insanity As A Defense In Criminal Law, 148-51 (1933).
5. See State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 58 Atl. 905 (1904).
6. State v. Buck, 205 Iowa 1028, 219 N.W. 17 (1928).
7. State v. DeHaan, 88 Mont. 407, 292 Pac. 1109 (1930); accord, State v. Grear, 29
Minn. 221, 13 N.W. 140 (1882) ("fair preponderance" is unobjectionable). But cf.
State v. Wallace, 170 Ore. 60, 131 P.2d 222 (1942) (beyond a reasonable doubt); State
v. Cole, 2 Pen. 344, 45 AtI. 391 (Del. 1899) (to the satisfaction of the jury).
8. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
9. See State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 58 Atl. 905 (1904).
10. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); State v. Shuff, 9 Idaho 115, 72
Pac. 664 (1903) (the burden is on the government to make out the whole case).
11. Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225, 78 N.W. 508 (1899).
12. Duthey v. State, 131 Wis. 178, 111 N.W. 222 (1907) "If after considering all
the evidence, there remains in the minds of the jury any reasonable doubt of accused's
sanity, regardless of the source of such evidence, accused must be acquitted."
13. Davis v. United States 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
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dence must be introduced to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
sanity.14
Although the courts differ in opinion toward one or the other of the rules,
and the writers are not in agreement,1 5 the modern trend seems to require
a lesser degree of proof to uphold a defense of insanity. Nevertheless, it is
at least doubtful in the instant case, under either rule set out above, that
the defendant's mere assertion of loss of memory has sufficiently challenged
the presumption of sanity. 16
The precise question, however, was not whether the defendant had neu-
tralized the presumption of sanity by evidence sufficient to create a reason-
able doubt, but whether the same "reasonable doubt" test should govern
in determining if the defendant's evidence merited an instruction on the
issue of insanity, The court decided that the test should not apply because
it would tend unduly to strengthen the procedural effect of the presump-
tion of sanity. Thus, although the defendant failed to request instructions
and waived objection to those given by the trial court,' 7 the conviction was
reversed, in the light of Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,1s because of complete absence of instructions on the issue of in-
sanity. This ground was termed in the dissenting opinion as "a technicality
so flimsy and unsound that it had to be evolved out of the inner conscious-
ness of a member of the majority."
In a criminal case, if there is no competent evidence reasonably tending
to support the fact of insanity urged by the defendant as a defensive issue
in the case, there is no duty on the part of the court to instruct on the ques-
tion of insanity. 19 To raise the issue of insanity, it is not necessary that tes-
timony be conclusive 20; to justify an instruction on an issue raised by the
evidence, it is sufficient if the fact may reasonably be inferred from the
circumstances proved.21 But, courts are required to submit theories of cases
only when the theories are supported by some testimony of sufficient sub-
stance so that it appears, at least with some degree of likelihood, that there
14. Lilly v. People, 148 IMI. 467, 36 N.E. 95 (1894); accord, People v. Hickman, 204
Cal. 470, 268 Pac. 909 (1928) (the rule does not shift the burden of proof, but only
the burden of producing evidence and declares the quantum which must be produced tc
overcome the presumption).
15. 9 Wigmore, Evidence §2501 (3d ed. 1940). Contra: 2 Jones, Commentaries on the
Law of Evidence §535 (2d ed. 1926).
16. Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1908) (merest shadow of evidence that
defendant was not of sound mind; court refused instruction concerning sanity requested
by defendant, and instructed that the burden of proof was on the government to prove
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the burden is satisfied by the presumption of
sanity until evidence is given on the other side. No error); Halloway v. United States,
148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945) "For the purpose of conviction there is no twilight zone
between abnormality and insanity. An offender is wholly sane or wholly insane."
17. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30: "... No party may assign as error any portion of the
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consides
its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of hi
-objection ....
18. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (b): "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
19. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936) (whether sufficient evidence has
been adduced is for the trial court to determine).
20. Jordan v. State, 130 Tex. Cr.R. 363, 94 S.W.2d 741 (1936) (medical witness
-testified he treated defendant for syphilitic insanity).
21. State v. Silverman, 148 Ore. 296, 36 P.2d 342 (1934).
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could be a finding by the jury in response to such suggested issue.22 Where
loss of memory constitutes the whole defense under a plea of not guilty, it
would seem to follow that error prejudicial to the defendant could not be
claimed as a result of failure of the trial court to volunteer instructions upon
an illusive issue of insanity.23
The considerable difficulties that arise in criminal cases where insanity
is an issue have not been eased to any great extent by legislative action.
Several notable exceptions, however, have been established. Perhaps the
most practical and sensible treatment of the problem occurs under the "Briggs
Law" 24 in Massachusets where certain classes of offenders are subjected to
a mandatory pre-trial mental examination by a neutral agency. Although
the act exemplifies a stride in the right direction, its limitations necessarily
confine the scope of its effectiveness.25 A procedural improvement has been
enacted in Oregon where the defendant must file a pre-trial notice of his
intention to resort to the defense of insanity.26 Such required notice would
serve to eliminate some technical decisions which tend to confuse and com-
pound the issue of insanity.
PAUL K. PANCRATZ
LABOR LAW- PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY-FREE SPEECH.- At a con-
ference convened to consider a petition for certification of the Longshore-
man's Union as exclusive bargaining agent, Respondent stated that its volume
of business during 1948 exceeded $500,000. On the following day the em-
ployee who had served as the employee representative at the conference
reported back to the shop committee. Subsequently a rumor was circulated
throughout the plant that Respondent had made a $500,000 profit the pre-
ceding year. Respondent confronted the employee and demanded to know
if he had started this report. The employee was discharged for the alleged
reason that he had deliberately and maliciously lied in stating that the Re-
spondent had made "fantastic earnings." The National Labor Relations Board
found that the employee had not made these statements and that the dis-
charge was violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and Section 8 (a) (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act as the employee's conduct was within the scope
of protected concerted activity. Alternatively it was held, even if the em-
ployee had made an inaccurate statement, it was not made deliberately or
22. Nickens v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. R. 510, 100 S.W.2d 363 (1936). See Todorow
v. United States, 173 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949) (general rule in criminal cases that
court must instruct jury on all applicable law involved, whether or not he is requested
to do so, does not go beyond the requirements that the court instruct on the principles
of law which the jury should have in order to decide the factual issues presented).
23. Walls v. State, 142 Neb. 748, 7 N.W.2d 709 (1943) (where defendant's evidence
was that his mind was a complete blank during the period when the crime was committed,
refusal of instruction to acquit him if the jury had reasonable doubt as to his mental
capacity was not prejudicial error). However, in this case capital punishment was not
involved. Courts usually go to far greater lengths to protect the defendant, where the
death penalty is involved.
24. Mass. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 123, Sec. 100A.
25. See, Weihofen, Insanity As A Defense In Criminal Law, 405-6 (1933).
26. Ore. Code Ann. §26-846 (1930) "... Where the defendant . . . purposes to
show . . . that he was insane . . . he shall . . . file a written notice of his purpose . . .
If the defendant fails to file any such notice he shall not be entitled to introduce
evidence. ...."
